Cryptanalyzing an encryption scheme based on blind source separation by Li, SJ et al.
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON CIRCUITS AND SYSTEMSI: REGULAR PAPERS, VOL. 55, NO. 4, PAGES 1055-1063, APRIL 2008, DOI: 10.1109/TCSI.2008.916540 1
Cryptanalyzing an Encryption Scheme Based on
Blind Source Separation
Shujun Li, Chengqing Li, Kwok-Tung Lo, Member, IEEE and Guanrong Chen, Fellow, IEEE
AbstractRecently there is a proposal of using the underde-
termined BSS (blind source separation) principle to design image
and speech encryption. In this paper, we report a cryptanalysis
of this BSS-based encryption scheme and point out that it is
not secure against known/chosen-plaintext attack and chosen-
ciphertext attack. In addition, we discuss some other security
defects of the schemes: 1) it has a low sensitivity to part of the
key and to the plaintext; 2) it is weak against a ciphertext-only
differential attack; 3) a divide-and-conquer (DAC) attack can be
used to break part of the key. We nally analyze the role of BSS
in this approach towards cryptographically secure ciphers.
Index Termsblind source separation (BSS), speech encryp-
tion, image encryption, cryptanalysis, known-plaintext attack,
chosen-plaintext attack, chosen-ciphertext attack, differential
attack, divide-and-conquer (DAC) attack.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the rapid development of multimedia and networking
technologies, the security of multimedia data becomes more
and more important in many real applications. To fulll
such an increasing demand, during the past two decades
many encryption schemes have been proposed for protecting
multimedia data, including speech signals, images and videos
[1][9].
According to the nature of the data, multimedia encryption
schemes can be classied into two basic types: analog and
digital. Most early schemes were designed to encrypt analog
data in various ways: element permuting, signal masking,
frequency shufing, etc., all of which may be exerted in the
time domain or the transform domain, or both. However, due
to the simplicity of their encryption procedures, almost all
analog encryption schemes are not sufciently secure against
cryptographical attacks, especially those modern attacks such
as known/chosen-plaintext and chosen-ciphertext attacks [2],
[3], [10], [11]. As a comparison, in digital encryption schemes,
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one can employ many cryptographically strong ciphers, such
as DES [12] and AES [13], to achieve a higher level of
security. Besides, to achieve a higher efciency of encryption
and to meet some special demands of multimedia encryption
(such as format-compliance [14] and perceptual encryption
[15]), many specic multimedia encryption schemes have
also been developed [4][6]. Recent cryptanalysis work [16]
[30] has shown that some multimedia encryption schemes are
insecure against cryptographical attacks.
Recently Lin et al. suggested employing blind source sepa-
ration (BSS) for the purpose of image and speech encryption
[31][37]. The basic idea is to mix multiple plaintexts (or mul-
tiple segments of the same plaintext) with a number of secret
key signals, in the hope that an attacker has to solve a hard
mathematical problem  the underdetermined BSS problem. In
Sec. VII of [37], Lin et al. claimed that this BSS-based cipher
is immune from the attacks such as the ciphertext-only attack,
the known-plaintext, and the chosen-plaintext attack, as long
as the intractability of the underdetermined BSS problem is
guaranteed by the mixing matrix for encryption.
This paper re-evaluates the security of the BSS-based en-
cryption scheme and points out that it is actually insecure
against known/chosen-plaintext attack and chosen-ciphertext
attack. In addition, some other security defects are found
under the scenarios of ciphertext-only attack, including its low
sensitivity to the mixing matrix (part of the secret key) and to
the plaintext, and a differential attack can be recommended,
which works well when the matrix size is small. Based on the
cryptanalytic ndings, we further discuss the role of BSS in
this approach towards cryptographically secure ciphers.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In the
next section, a brief introduction is given to the BSS-based
encryption scheme. Section III is the main body of this
paper, which reports detailed cryptanalysis of the BSS-based
encryption scheme. Then, the role of BSS in cryptography is
discussed in Sec. IV. Finally, the last section concludes the
paper.
II. BSS-BASED ENCRYPTION
Blind source separation is a technique that tries to recover
a set of unobserved sources or signals from some observed
mixtures [38]. Given N unobserved signals s1; ¢ ¢ ¢ ; sN and a
mixing matrixA of sizeM£N , the BSS problem is to recover
s1; ¢ ¢ ¢ ; sN from M observed signals x1; ¢ ¢ ¢ ;xM , where
[x1; ¢ ¢ ¢ ;xM ]T = A[s1; ¢ ¢ ¢ ; sN ]T : (1)
When M ¸ N , blind source separation is possible if A
satises some conditions. However, when M < N , this is
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generally impossible (whatever A is), thus leading to the
difcult underdetermined BSS problem.
In [31][37], Lin et al. introduced a number of secret key
signals to make the determination of the plaintext signals
become an underdetermined BSS problem in the case that
the key signals are unknown. Given P input plain-signals
s1(t); ¢ ¢ ¢ ; sP (t) and Q key signals k1(t); ¢ ¢ ¢ ; kQ(t), the
encryption procedure is described as follows1:
x(t) = [x1(t); ¢ ¢ ¢ ; xP (t)]T = Ask(t); (2)
where x(t) denote P cipher-signals, sk(t) =
[s1(t); ¢ ¢ ¢ ; sP (t); k1(t); ¢ ¢ ¢ ; kQ(t)]T , and A is a P£(P+Q)
mixing matrix whose elements are within [¡1; 1]. Write
A = [As;Ak], where As is a P £ P matrix and Ak is
a P £ Q matrix. Then, the encryption procedure can be
represented in an equivalent form as
x(t) = Ass(t) +Akk(t); (3)
where s(t) = [s1(t); ¢ ¢ ¢ ; sP (t)]T and k(t) =
[k1(t); ¢ ¢ ¢ ; kQ(t)]T . Thus, as long as As is an invertible
matrix, one can decrypt s(t) as follows2:
s(t) = A¡1s (x(t)¡Akk(t)) : (4)
Different values of Q was used in Lin et al.'s papers: Q = 1
in [31] and Q = P in [32][37]. When Q = P , Lin et al.
further set As = B and Ak = ¯B, where ¯ ¸ 10 for image
encryption and ¯ ¸ 1 for speech encryption. In this case, the
encryption procedure becomes
x(t) = B (s(t) + ¯k(t)) ; (5)
and the decryption procedure becomes
s(t) = B¡1x(t)¡ ¯k(t): (6)
Observing Eq. (3), one can see that the encryption procedure
contains two steps:
² Step 1: x(1)(t) = Ass(t);
² Step 2: x(t) = x(1)(t) +Akk(t).
The rst step corresponds to a simple matrix-based block
cipher, and the second step corresponds to a simple addition-
based stream cipher. From a different point of view, the two
steps are exchanged as follows:
² Step 1: x(1)(t) = s(t) +A¡1s Akk(t);
² Step 2: x(t) = Asx(1)(t).
In any case, the BSS-based encryption scheme is always a
product cipher composed by a simple block cipher and a
simple stream cipher. In next section, we will show that the
two sub-ciphers can be separately broken by known/chosen-
plaintext attack and chosen-ciphertext attack.
In Lin et al.'s BSS-based encryption scheme, the key signals
k1(t); ¢ ¢ ¢ ; kQ(t) are so long as the plain-signals and have to
1To provide a clearer description of the BSS-based encryption scheme, in
this paper we use some notations different from those in Lin et al.'s original
papers. For example, in [37], the i-th key signal is denoted by sni(t), while
in this paper we use ki(t) to emphasize the fact that it is a key signal.
2In Lin et al.'s papers, it is said that the decryption procedure was
achieved via BSS. However, from the cryptographical point of view, it is
more convenient to denote the decryption procedure by Eq. (4).
be generated by a pseudo-random number generator (PRNG)
with a secret seed I0, which serves as the secret key. According
to the principle of BSS, the decryption process actually does
not need any knowledge about the mixing matrixA to separate
(i.e., decrypt) the encrypted plain-signals (i.e., the plaintexts).
So, it seems that Lin et al. do not consider A as part of the
secret key. However, we believe that A should be kept secret
like part of the key, due to the following considerations:
² From a cryptographer's point of view, except for the
secret key, all details about a cryptosystem are known
to attackers. So, if A is not part of the secret key, it
should be considered known to attackers. Unfortunately,
in this case the product cipher will be degraded to be
a simple stream cipher. Considering x¤(t) = A¡1s x(t)
as the equivalent cipher-signal, the encryption procedure
becomes
x¤(t) = s(t) +A¡1s Akk(t): (7)
From the above equation, one can see that the encryption
scheme is actually independent of the underdetermined
BSS problem.
² As the theoretical basis of the BSS technique, it is
assumed that the input signals are mutually independent
of each other. Though Lin et al. have shown that the BSS
techniques can work well for some images and speeches,
it remains doubtful if the BSS technique can still work
well to decrypt closely-related input signals (such as an
image and its watermarked version, or consecutive frames
in a movie). Thus, the knowledge about A is required
to ensure that any plaintexts can be exactly decrypted
in any case. This is the reason why we represent the
decryption procedure as Eq. (4) without employing any
BSS algorithm.
² As will be shown later in Sec. III-A.4, the key signals can
be totally circumvented in a ciphertext-only differential
attack, so the mixing matrix A must be kept secret as a
second defence to maintain the security.
Thus, in this paper we assume that the secret key consists of
both I0 and A. Note also that adding A into the secret key
will denitely lead to a stronger (at least equivalently strong)
cryptosystem compared with the one with a single key I0. By
cryptanalyzing the stronger cryptosystem, the original one is
also cryptanalyzed.
In [31][35], the BSS-based encryption scheme was mainly
designed to encrypt P images simultaneously, where si(t) is
the t-th pixel in the i-th image. In [36], [37], the encryption
scheme was suggested to encrypt a single speech, each frame
of which is divided into P segments and si(t) is the t-th
sample in the i-th segment. This encryption scheme can also
be applied to a single image, by dividing it into P blocks
of the same size. To facilitate the following discussion, we
assume that the encryption scheme is used to encrypt a single
plaintext with P segments of equal sizes.
In Sec. VII of [37], it was claimed that the BSS-based
encryption scheme is secure against most modern crypto-
graphical attacks, including the ciphertext-only attack, known-
plaintext attack, and chosen-plaintext attack. In the next sec-
tion, we will show that this claim is questionable.
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III. CRYPTANALYSIS
Before introducing the cryptanalytic results, let us see how
large the key space is. In [31][37], each element of A is
restricted within the interval [¡1; 1]. Thus, assuming that each
element in A has R possible values3, the number of all
possible mixing matrixA is RP (P+Q). Furthermore, assuming
that the bit size of I0 is L, the size of the whole key space is
RP (P+Q)2L. When Q = P and A = [B; ¯B], the size of the
whole key space is RP
2
2L. Later, we will show that the real
size of the key space is much smaller than this estimation, due
to some essential security defects of the BSS-based encryption
scheme. We will also explain why this encryption scheme is
not secure against known/chosen-plaintext attack and chosen-
ciphertext attack.
A. Ciphertext-Only Attack
1) Divide-and-Conquer (DAC) Attack: Rewriting Eq. (4) in
the following form:
s(t) = A^xk(t); (8)
where xk(t) = [x1(t); ¢ ¢ ¢ ; xP (t); k1(t); ¢ ¢ ¢ ; kQ(t)]T and
A^ = A¡1s [I;¡Ak] =
£
A¡1s ;¡A¡1s Ak
¤
:
From the above equation, to recover si(t), one only needs to
know k(t) and the i-th row of A^. In other words, when the
BSS-based encryption scheme is used to encrypt P indepen-
dent plaintexts, the i-th plaintext can be exactly recovered with
the knowledge of I0 and the i-th row of A^. A similar result
can be obtained when P segments of one single plaintext is
encrypted with the encryption scheme. This fact means that
P rows of A^ can be separately broken with a divide-and-
conquer (DAC) attack. As a result, the size of the key space is
reduced to be PR(P+Q)2L. When Q = P and A = [B; ¯B],
it becomes PRP 2L.
2) Low Sensitivity to A: From the cryptographical point of
view, given two distinct keys, even if their difference is the
minimal value under the current nite precision, the encryption
and decryption results of a good cryptosystem should still
be completely different. In other words, this cryptosystem
should have a very high sensitivity to the secret key [12].
Unfortunately, the BSS-based encryption scheme does not
satisfy this security principle, because the involved matrix
computation is not sufciently sensitive to matrix mismatch.
Given two matrices A1 = [a1;i;j ] and A2 = [a2;i;j ] of
size M £ N , if the maximal difference of all elements is
", then one can easily deduce that ¢xi, the i-th element of
3The value of R is determined by the nite precision under which the
cryptosystem is realized. For example, if the cryptosystem is implemented
with n-bit xed-point arithmetic, R = 2n; if it is implemented with IEEE
oating-point arithmetic, R ¼ 231 (single-precision) or R ¼ 263 (double-
precision) [39], where the sign bit of the oating-point number is always
negative.
¢x = A1s(t)¡A2s(t), satises the following inequality:
j¢xij =
¯¯¯¯
¯¯ NX
j=1
(a1;i;j ¡ a2;i;j)sj
¯¯¯¯
¯¯ ;
·
NX
j=1
ja1;i;j ¡ a2;i;j j ¢ jsj j;
· N"max(js(t)j);
where js(t)j denotes the vector composed of absolutes values
of all elements in s(t), i.e., js(t)j = [ js1(t)j ¢ ¢ ¢ jsN (t)j ]T
(the same expression will also be used for other vec-
tors/matrices afterwards without further explanation). As a
result, the matrix A can be approximately guessed under a
relatively large nite precision ", still maintaining an accept-
able quality of the recovered plaintexts. Since under the nite
precision " one only needs to guess d2="e values of each
element in A, the size of the key space is signicantly reduced
from PR(P+Q)2L to P d2="e(P+Q)2L, where d2="e(P+Q) ¿
R(P+Q).4 When Q = P and A = [B; ¯B], the size of key
space is reduced from PRP 2L to P d2="eP 2L.
The above low sensitivity can be easily veried with exper-
iments described as follows:
² Step 1: for a randomly-generated key (A; I0), calculate
the ciphertext x(t) corresponding to a plaintext s(t);
² Step 2: with another mismatched key (A + "R; I0),
decrypt x(t) to get ~s(t)  an estimated version of s(t),
where " 2 (0; 1) and R is a P£(P+Q) random (1;¡1)-
matrix.
For each value of ", the second step was repeated for 100
times to get a mean value of the recovery error (measured
in MAE  mean absolute error)5. Then, one can observe the
relationship between the recovery error and the value of ".
Figure 1 shows the experimental results when the plaintexts
are a digital image and a speech le, respectively.
The experimental results conrm that a mismatched key can
approximately recover the plaintext. Considering that humans
have a good capability of correcting errors in viewing images
and listening to speech, even relatively large errors may not be
able to prevent a human attacker from recognizing the plain-
image or plain-speech. Thus, the value of " may be relatively
large. When P = 4, A = [B; ¯B] and " = 0:1, we give two
examples of such recognizable plaintexts with relatively large
errors in Figs. 2 and 3.
From the above experimental results, we can exhaustively
search for an approximate version of A under the nite
precision " = 0:01 » 0:1. Such an approximate version of A
is then used to roughly reveal the plaintext. Since the searching
complexity is O
¡
P d2="eP+Q¢, such an exhaustive search is
feasible when P;Q is not very large6. When P = 2 and
4In this paper, dxe denotes the ceiling function of x, i.e., the minimal
integer that is not less than x.
5When the plaintext is a digital image with 256 gray scales, we rst calibrate
each sub-image into the range f0; ¢ ¢ ¢ ; 255g and then calculate the recovery
error of the whole image.
6In [31][37], small values are used in all examples: P = 2 or 4 and
Q · P .
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Legend: ¤  P = Q = 4; ±  P = 4 and A = [B; ¯B]
(¯ = 10).
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Legend: ¤  P = Q = 4; ±  P = 4 and A = [B; ¯B]
(¯ = 2).
b)
Fig. 1. The experimental relationship between the recovery error and the
value of ": a) the plaintext is a digital image Lenna (Fig. 3a); b) the plaintext
is a speech le one.wav that corresponds to the pronunciation of the English
word one (from Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, http://www.m-w.com).
A = [B; ¯B], we carried out a large number of experiments
in the following steps:
² Step 1: for a randomly-generated key (B; I0), calculate
the ciphertext x(t) corresponding to a plaintext s(t);
² Step 2: randomly generate a matrix R (each element
in the interval [¡1; 1]), and then decrypt x(t) with the
guessed key (R; I0) to get ~s(t);
² Step 3: repeat Step 2 for r rounds, output the recovered
plaintext ~s¤(t), every segment of which corresponds to
the best recovery performance in all the r rounds;
² Step 4: for the i-th segment of ~s¤(t), nd the correspond-
ing matrix R, and extract its i-th row of its inverse R¡1
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
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0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
−0.5
0
0.5
b)
Fig. 2. An example of human capability of recognition against large noises
in speech: a) the original plain-speech one.wav; b) the recovered speech
(MAE=0.164103). For reader's verication, the recovered speech is posted on-
line at http://www.hooklee.com/Papers/Data/BSSE/one MAE=0.164103.wav.
a) b)
Fig. 3. An example of human capability of recognition against large noises
in images: a) the original plain-image Lenna; b) the recovered image
(MAE=47.6913).
to form the i-th row of ~B
¡1
, the inverse of an estimation
of the original matrix B.
Assuming that the target nite precision is " > 0, the interval
[¡1; 1] is divided into n" = d2="e sub-intervals. Without
loss of generality, assume that 2=" is an integer. Then, each
sub-interval is of equal size. Thus, if the element in the
random matrix R has a uniform distribution over [¡1; 1], the
probability that jri;j ¡ ai;j j < " occurs at least one time in r
rounds of experiment is p(n"; r) = 1¡(1¡1=n")r, where ri;j
and ai;j are the (i; j)-th elements of R and A, respectively.
One can easily deduce that p(n"; r) is an increasing function
with respect to r and
p(n"; n") > lim
n"!1
p(n"; n") = 1¡ lim
n"!1
(1¡ 1=n")n"
= 1¡ e¡1 ¼ 0:6321;
which results in that p(n"; r) > 1 ¡ e¡1 when r ¸ n". In
other words, with r ¸ n" experiments, it is a high-probability
event that at least one ri;j is equal to ai;j under the nite
precision ". To get an approximate estimation of the i-th row
of A, one can see that r = O
¡
nP"
¢
rounds of experiment are
needed.
Apparently, the above steps actually simulate the process of
a real ciphertext-only attack that tries to reveal the plaintext
and to exhaustively guess B¡1 (under the assumption that I0
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is known). Note that MAE cannot be calculated to evaluate
the recovery performance in a real attack, in which one
does not know the plaintext. Fortunately, exploiting the large
information redundancy existing in natural images and speech
signals, one can resort to use some other measures to reect
the recovery performance of each segment of ~s(t). In our
experiments, we use a measure called MANE (mean absolute
neighboring error), which is dened as follows for the i-th
segment of ~s(t):
1
T ¡ 2
T¡1X
t=2
j~si(t)¡ ~si(t¡ 1)j+ j~si(t)¡ ~si(t+ 1)j
2
; (9)
where T denotes the segment length. In Figs. 4 and 5, one
recovered plain-speech signals and two recovered plain-images
are shown for demonstration. One can see that r = O(10; 000)
(or " ¼ 0:01) is sufcient to get a good estimation of the
plaintext.
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Fig. 4. A recovered speech in one 50,000-round experiment of exhaustively
guessing A when P = 2 and A = [B; ¯B]: a) the original plain-
speech one.wav; b) the recovered speech (MANE of each segment: 0.0469,
0.0521). For reader's verication, the recovered speech is posted online at
http://www.hooklee.com/Papers/Data/BSSE/one MANE=0.0469-0.0521.wav.
a) b)
Fig. 5. Two recovered plain-images in experiments of exhaustively guessing
B when P = 2 and A = [B; ¯B]: a) r = 1; 000 (MANE of each segment:
39.7491, 14.9373); b) r = 10; 000 (MANE of each segment: 16.3888,
15.1722).
Note that for 2-D images the above 1-D MANE may be
generalized to include more neighboring pixels, thus achieving
a more accurate description of the recovery performance. In
addition, multiple quality factors can be employed to further
enhance the evaluation of the recovery performance.
3) Low Sensitivity to k(t): Due to the same reason as
the low sensitivity to A, one can deduce that the BSS-
based encryption scheme is also insensitive to the key signal
k(t). Given two key signals k1(t) and k2(t), if the maxi-
mal difference of all elements is ", then each element of
jAkk1(t)¡Akk2(t)j is not greater than Qmax(jAkj)" = Q".
Since k(t) itself is not part of the secret key, but generated
from I0, this problem does not have much negative inuence
on the security of the whole cryptosystem against ciphertext-
only attacks.
4) Differential Attack: Given two plaintexts s(1)(t) and
s(2)(t), if they are encrypted with the same key (A; I0), one
can get the following formula from Eq. (3):
¢x(t) = As¢s(t); (10)
where ¢x(t) = x(1)(t)¡x(2)(t) and ¢s(t) = s(1)(t)¡s(2)(t).
Note that Akk(t) disappears from the above equation. This
means that from the differential viewpoint only As is the
secret key, i.e., I0 is insignicant in the key. Considering the
low sensitivity of the encryption scheme to A, under nite
precision " the key space becomes O
¡
PnP"
¢
, and so one might
exhaustively search As to recover the plaintext difference as
follows:
¢s(t) = A¡1s ¢x(t): (11)
From the obtained plaintext difference, one can get a mixed
view of the two interested plaintexts, in which both plaintexts
may be completely recognizable by humans. Figures 6 and 7
show four plaintext differences of two speech les and two
images.
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Fig. 6. Differences of two plain-speech les: a) the rst speech
one.wav; b) the second speech two.wav; c) the difference speech
signal one¡two; d) the difference speech signal two¡one.
For readers' verication, the two difference speech les are posted
online at http://www.hooklee.com/Papers/Data/BSSE/one-two.wav and
http://www.hooklee.com/Papers/Data/BSSE/two-one.wav.
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a) b)
Fig. 7. Differences of two plain-images, Lenna and cameraman: a)
Lenna-cameraman; b) cameraman-Lenna.
Denoting the guessed matrix by ~As, one has
~¢s(t) = ~A
¡1
s ¢x(t) = ~A
¡1
s As¢s(t): (12)
Apparently, if ~As 6= As, the obtained plaintext difference
~¢s(t) will have an inter-segment mixture, which may make the
recognition of the two plaintexts more difcult. Fortunately,
when P is relatively small, such an inter-segment mixture
may not be too severe to prevent the recognition of the
two plaintexts by humans. More importantly, our experiments
showed that humans are able to recognize the two plaintexts
even when the mismatch between ~As andAs is not very small.
When P = 2,
As =
·
0:7123 ¡0:4272
0:1958 0:1295
¸
, ~As =
·
0:5914 0:9527
0:5726 0:1437
¸
; (13)
a plain difference-image obtained in our experiments is shown
in Fig. 8. One can see that both plain-images, Lenna and
cameraman, can still be roughly recognized from such
a heavily mixed difference-image. Another obtained plain
difference-speech for one.wav and two.wav, is shown in
Fig. 9, from which the two English words (one and two)
are also distinguishable.
Fig. 8. One obtained plain difference-images with a badly-mismatched key
when P = 2.
To further show the real performance of the differential
attack with a badly-mismatched key, we have also carried out
some experiments on the plain-images Lenna and camera-
0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35 0.4 0.45 0.5
−0.2
0
0.2
Fig. 9. One obtained plain difference-speech when As and ~As have a
relatively large mismatch. For readers' verication, this difference-speech
is posted online at http://www.hooklee.com/Papers/Data/BSSE/two-one-large-
mismatch.wav.
man when P = 4,
As =
2664
0:6444 ¡0:2417 ¡0:2687 ¡0:7043
¡0:1770 0:2778 0:5539 ¡0:7035
0:0539 ¡0:6525 ¡0:3157 0:2781
0:8404 0:5716 0:5484 ¡0:8133
3775
and
~As =
2664
0:9283 0:8109 0:9567 0:4825
0:1668 0:4057 0:8549 0:3246
0:3868 0:7950 0:9863 0:0574
0:4860 0:0194 0:2507 0:2910
3775 :
One result is shown in Fig. 10.
Fig. 10. One obtained plain difference-image with a badly-mismatched key
when P = 4.
a) b)
Fig. 11. A visually-optimal result obtained in 100 plain difference-images: a)
the optimal difference-image; b) the negative of the optimal difference-image.
In this differential attack, some quality evaluation factors
(such as MANE used in Sec. III-A.2) are not suitable to auto-
matically determine the best result in many plain difference-
signals, because each segment of an obtained difference-signal
is also a natural signal with abundant information redundancy.
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Instead, one has to output all obtained difference-signals, and
check them with naked eyes or ears to nd a perceptually-
optimal result with the least inter-segment mixture. Figure 11
shows such a result in 100 plain difference-images when
P = 2 and A follows Eq. (13). By checking each segment
separately and combining the P optimal segments together,
one can further get a better result with less inter-segment
mixture.
While this differential attack works well for P = 2 as shown
above, it will become infeasible when P is sufciently large,
due to the following reasons: 1) the inter-segment mixture is
too severe; 2) the complexity of checking all O
¡
P d2="eP ¢
difference-signals is beyond human's capability.
B. Low Sensitivity to Plaintext
Another cryptographical property required by a good cryp-
tosystem is that the encryption should be very sensitive to
plaintext, i.e., the ciphertexts of two plaintexts with a slight dif-
ference should be very different [12]. However, this property
does not hold for the BSS-based encryption scheme. Given
two key signals s1(t) and s2(t), if the maximal difference of
all elements is ", then each element of jAss1(t) ¡Ass2(t)j
is not greater than P max(jAsj)" = P". When the same
secret key is used to encrypt two closely-correlated plaintexts,
such as a plaintext and its watermarked version, this security
defect means that the exposure of one plaintext leads to the
revealment of both.
C. Known-Plaintext Attack
In this kind of attack, one can access to a number of
plaintexts that are encrypted with the same key. From Eq. (10),
with P plaintext differences, one immediately knows that the
mixing matrix can be uniquely determined as follows:
As = ¢X(t)(¢S(t))¡1; (14)
where ¢S(t) and ¢X(t) are P £P matrices, constructed row
by row from the P plaintext differences and the corresponding
ciphertext differences, respectively. Then, Akk(t) can be
further solved from any plaintext and its ciphertext:
Akk(t) = x(t)¡Ass(t): (15)
Now, (As;Akk(t)) can be used to recover other plaintexts
encrypted by the same key (A; I0). Note that Akk(t) has a
nite length determined by the maximal length of all known
plaintexts, so (As;Akk(t)) can only recover plaintexts under
this nite length.
WhenA = [B; ¯B], the key signals can also be determined:
k(t) =
s(t)¡B¡1x(t)
¯
: (16)
If the PRNG used is not cryptographically strong (such as
LFSR [12]), it may be possible to further derive the secret
seed I0, thus completely breaking the BSS-based encryption
scheme.
Note that n distinct plaintexts can generate
¡
n
2
¢
= n(n ¡
1)=2 plaintext differences. Solving the inequality n(n¡1)=2 ¸
P , one can get the number of required plaintexts to yield at
least P plaintext differences:
n ¸
lp
P ¡ 1=4 + 1=2
m
¼
p
P: (17)
D. Chosen-Plaintext/Ciphertext Attack
In chosen-plaintext attack, one can freely choose a number
of plaintexts and observe the corresponding ciphertexts, while
in chosen-ciphertext attack, one can freely choose a number
of ciphertexts and observe the corresponding plaintexts. So, in
these attacks, one can choose P plaintext differences easily,
which means that the above differential known-plaintext attack
still works ne in the same way.
IV. DISCUSSION
As we pointed out in the last section, the BSS-based encryp-
tion scheme is always insecure against known/chosen-plaintext
attack. So, the secret key cannot be repeatedly used in any
case. This means that the encryption scheme has to work like
a common stream cipher, by changing the secret key for each
distinct plaintext. However, in this case, k(t) (equivalently, the
secret seed I0) is enough to provide a high level of security,
since k(t) satises the cryptographical properties in a perfectly
secure one-time-a-pad cipher (see Sec. V.B of [37]). This
means that the BSS process becomes excessive.
Even when one wants to add a second function against
potential attacks by applying the BSS mixing, the low sensi-
tivity of encryption/decryption to the mixing matrix A (recall
Sec. III-A.2) makes this goal less useful. As a result, in the
current encryption design, the BSS model does not play a
key role in the security of the scheme. The real core of
the encryption scheme actually is the embedded PRNG that
generates the key signals for masking the plaintexts.
If one wants to use the BSS-based encryption scheme
with a repeatedly used key, some essential modications have
to be made to enhance the security against various attacks.
Following the cryptanalysis given in the last section, we
suggest adopting two coutermeasures simultaneously: 1) use a
sufciently large P ; 2) like the design of most modern block
ciphers [12], iterate the BSS-based encryption for many rounds
to improve its sensitivity to the secret key and to the plaintext.
It is obvious that both countermeasures will signicantly
inuence the encryption/decryption speed of the encryption
scheme. It therefore seems doubtful if such an enhanced
encryption scheme will have any advantages comparing with
other multiple-round block ciphers, especially AES [13] that
can be optimized to run at a very high rate on PCs [40].
Finally, it is worth mentioning that the original BSS-based
encryption scheme can be used to realize lossy decryption, an
interesting feature that may be useful in some real applica-
tions7. This feature means that an encryption scheme can still
(perhaps roughly) recover the plaintext even when there are
some errors in the ciphertexts. An typical use of this feature
is that the ciphertext can be compressed with some lossy
algorithms to save the required storage in local computers or
7Another possible scheme is a matrix-based image scrambling system
proposed in [41], as pointed out in [30].
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the channel bandwidth for transmission. For the BSS-based
encryption scheme, the lossy decryption feature is ensured by
low sensitivity of decryption to ciphertext, which is due to the
same reason of the low sensitivity of encryption to plaintext
(recall Sec. III-B). However, one should keep in mind that the
lossy decryption feature is induced by the low sensitivity to
plaintext/ciphertext, so there is a tradeoff between this feature
and the security.
V. CONCLUSION
This paper has analyzed the security of an image/speech
encryption scheme based on BSS mixing technique proposed
in [31][37]. It has been shown that this BSS-based encryp-
tion scheme suffers from several security defects, includ-
ing its vulnerability to a ciphertext-only differential attack,
known/chosen-plaintext attack and chosen-ciphertext attack. It
remains to see how the BSS-based technique can be further
improved for constructing cryptographically strong ciphers.
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